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PANTER v. MARSHALL FIELD & CO.: THE GOOD FAITH
STANDARD FOR CORPORATE DIRECTORS
Corporate directors traditionally have been immunized from liability
for corporate actions involving questions of policy or "business judg-
ment," if such actions are taken in the exercise of due care, in good faith,
and in compliance with applicable fiduciary duties.1 Judicial review of de-
cisions made by corporate boards of directors in unsolicited takeovers 2
generally has been barred by this business judgment rule.3 A recent chal-
lenge to this precept was brought in Panter v. Marshall Field & Co.,4 a
Seventh Circuit decision which highlighted many of the issues surround-
ing application of the business judgment rule in the context of a take-over
attempt.
This comment will review the Seventh Circuit's decision in the Mar-
shall Field case and assess its implications for directors in exercising
"reasonable business judgment" in good faith and for shareholders in
challenging the actions of the directors. Although the divided court 5 up-
0
1. A basic articulation of the business judgment rule is:
If in the course of management, directors arrive at a decision ... for which there is a
reasonable basis, and they act in good faith, as the result of their independent discre-
tion and judgment, and uninfluenced by any consideration other than what they hon-
estly believe to be the best interests of the corporation, a court will not interfere...
and substitute its judgment for that of the directors ....
H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BusINEss Ew rERPmsEs § 242,
at 482 (2d ed. 1970). If the duty of care or the fiduciary duties owed by directors to the
corporation are breached, the directors may be jointly and severally liable to the corporation
itself and to the shareholders. Id. at 458. The fiduciary duties include those of good faith
and fair dealing in the best interests of the corporation. Id.
2. A takeover involves an offer or solicitation by a company to purchase all or a portion of
the stock of another company during a fixed period of time for a specified price or on speci-
fied terms for cash and an exchange of stock. E. ARANow & H. EINHoRN, TENDER OFFERS FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL 70 (1973). The "raider's" offer to the "target" company is unsolicited
and deemed unfriendly. Such offers are hostile to the management of the target corporation.
Bowers, It's a Raid! Strategies for Avoiding Takeovers, 3 WHARTON MAGAZINE 22, 22 (Sum-
mer 1979). See also Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168, 1175 (N.D. I. 1980),
afl'd, 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981).
3. See, e.g., Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980); Crouse-Hinds Co.
v. InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980); Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F.2d 192 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 354 (1980); Golub v. PPD Corp., 576 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1978); Gulf &
Western Indus., Inc. v. Great A & P Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973); Berman v. Gerber
Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978); Armstrong Cork Co. v. H. A. Meldrum
Co., 285 F. 58 (W.D.N.Y. 1922); GM Sub Corp. v. Liggett Group, Inc., 415 A.2d 473 (Del.
1980).
4. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981).
5. The decision was made by a three judge panel with a vigorous dissent to the majority
opinion. Id. at 299. See notes 145-68 infra and accompanying text.
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held actions of the defendant-directors taken in exercise of their business
judgment, the case seems to point the way to heightened judicial scrutiny
of corporate boardroom decisions and perhaps suggests that a new look
be taken at duties owed by directors to the corporation and its
shareholders.
I. THE BusiNEss JUDGMENT RULE
A. Definition and Scope of the Rule
The business judgment rule states generally that a corporate director
who conscientiously attends to his or her duties and exercises good busi-
ness judgment on the questions facing the board will not be personally
liable even if the judgment is faulty and the corporation thereby incurs
some detrimental effect.8 "Implicit in this statement of the rule is that
there be an affirmative directorial judgment" and some resulting injury to
either the corporation or the shareholders.7 The rule provides a substan-
tive defense for honest, non-negligent errors in judgment and insulates
directors from personal liability in the shifting, often hazardous business
world.8 The business judgment rule recognizes the fallibility of directors
as human beings and their inability to please all stockholders at all times"
and facilitates business growth by providing an unshackled environment
in which board members may make decisions and freely act on them.10 It
also limits judicial review in areas best left to business expertise and acu-
men and preserves judicial economy.11 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in Smith v. Brown-Borhek Co.12 justified the business judgment rule as
follows:
[ffn the business world.., it is too often forgotten that all businesses do
not flourish, nearly every business has some losses and some bad accounts,
and many insolvencies and bankruptcies frequently occur even in these
6. See Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HoFSTRA L. REV. 93, 93-97 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Arsht, Business Judgment]. See, e.g., Hodges v. New England Screw
Co., 3 R.I. 9, 18 (1853).
7. Arsht, Business Judgment, supra note 6, at 112.
8. Id. at 111. See generally Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 1980); Smith
v. Brown-Borhek Co., 414 Pa. 325, -, 200 A.2d 398, 401 (1964); H. HENN, supra note 1, at
482.
9. Arsht, Business Judgment, supra note 6, at 95.
10. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556, 558 (Del. Ch. 1977); Auerbach v. Bennett,
47 N.Y.2d 619, 629, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 N;Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979); 3A W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF TH LAW OF PRIVATE COPORATIONS § 1039 (rev. perm. ed. 1975); ABA, Cor-
porate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1595, 1604 (1978); Johnson and Osborne, The
Role of the Business Judgment Rule in a Litigious Society, 15 VAL. U. L. REV. 49, 54
(1980).
11. Johnson and Osborne, supra note 10, at 54.
12. 414 Pa. 325, 200 A.2d 390 (1964) (case involving negligent mismanagement of corpo-
rate funds due to an over-extension of credit to a large customer, which was authorized by
the Brown-Borhek Company directors).
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prosperous times. . . . From an early date this court has consistently and
realistically recognized the danger of subjecting corporate directors to liabil-
ity whenever any of the transactions of the company did not meet with
success.
13
Since the management of all corporations rests with the directors, 14 the
courts historically have been concerned with obtaining quality directors.15
Of necessity, directors need to be persons of reason, intellect, and integ-
rity. In order to attract such individuals, the business judgment rule was
formulated to protect their decisions from needless attack and "Monday-
morning-quarterbacking."16
The business judgment rule has been part of corporate law for at least
150 years.1 7 It came into being as a result of the growth of industry in the
late nineteenth century. Perhaps the earliest expression of the purpose
and limits of the rule is found in Percy v. Millaudon,18 an 1829 Louisiana
Supreme Court decision involving the liability of bank directors for losses
resulting from the misappropriation of funds by the bank's president and
cashier. The Lousiana court noted that "the adoption of a course from
which loss ensues cannot make the agent responsible, if the error was one
into which a prudent man might have fallen."119 Approximately twenty-
five years later, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island succinctly stated the
business judgment rule in Hodges v. New England Screw Co.2 0 In an ef-
fort to save the New England Screw Company from bankruptcy, its direc-
tors authorized the corporation to purchase stock in another company. It
then forced that company to lend money and extend credit to New Eng-
land." Although the directors were found to have exercised good faith
and acted in the company's best interests, their actions had violated New
13. Id. at , 200 A.2d at 401.
14. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (Supp. 1980); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 701
(McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). See generally ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr § 35 (1977);
N. LATrrl, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 69 (2d ed. 1971).
15. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained:
If the test of negligence which is applicable in the field of torts or in the Estate field
were similarly applicable in the business or banking field, it would realistically be
very difficult if not almost impossible to secure the services of able and experienced
corporate directors. Such persons would rarely ever accept a directorship if they
could be held liable for every 'bad' account or every mistake of judgment.
414 Pa. at -, 200 A.2d at 401. See also Godbold v. Branch Bank, 11 Ala. 191, 199 (1847).
16. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 297 (7th Cir. 1981); Cheff v. Mathes, 41
Del. Ch. 494, -, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (1964); Smith v. Brown-Borhek Co., 414 Pa. 325,
200 A.2d 398, 401 (1964).
17. Arsht, Business Judgment, supra note 6, at 93. See, e.g., Smith v. Prattville Mfg. Co.,
29 Ala. 503 (1857); Godbold v. Branch Bank, 11 Ala. 191 (1847); Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart.
(n.s.) 68 (La. 1829); Hodges v. New England Screw Co., 1 R.I. 312 (1850).
18. 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68 (La. 1829).
19. Id. at 77-78.
20. 1 R.I. 312 (1850), rehearing denied, 3 R.I. 9 (1853).
21. 1 R.I. at 342.
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England's charter.22 In refusing to hold them liable for the resulting
losses, the court said, "we think a Board of Directors acting in good faith
and with reasonable care and diligence, who nevertheless fall into a mis-
take, either as to law or fact, are not liable for the consequences of such
mistake."23 The articulation of the rule as an abstract principle of law has
changed little since that time.24 Today, in most states, the rule is derived
from case law.25 Twenty states have statutes codifying the standard of
care to be exercised by directors. 26
The standard of care or the duty of due care owed by corporate direc-
tors to the corporation found early expression in Hun v. Cary,27 where a
receiver of a savings bank sued the directors of the bank for negligent
mismanagement. The court said that it was the duty of directors to exer-
cise the same degree of care and prudence that a reasonable man would
exercise in the management of his own affairs,2 and that one who volun-
tarily takes a position as director represents to the shareholders "that he
possesses at least ordinary knowledge and skill, and that he will bring
22. Id. at 346-47.
23. 3 R.I. at 18.
24. See Schein v. Caesar's World, Inc., 491 F.2d 17, 18 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
838 (1974); Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 518 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168,
1194, aff'd, 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981); Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp. 240,
243-44 (D. Neb. 1972), aff'd, 473 F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1973).
25. Veasey and Manning, Codified Standard-Safe Harbor or Uncharted Reef? An Anal-
ysis of the Model Act Standard of Care Compared with Delaware Law, 35 Bus. LAW. 919,
920 (1980).
26. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 309 (West 1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(d) (West
Supp. 1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.111(4)-(7) (West 1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-713 (1977);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-1-35 (1980); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-2-11(2) (Burns Supp. 1981); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 496A.34 (West Supp. 1981-1982); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12.92 (West 1969); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (1964); MD. CORP. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 2:405.1 (Supp.
1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 65 (West 1969); MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. §
450.1541 (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200 (1973)); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.31 (West 1969); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5535 (1975); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.34(b) (West 1951); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1408 (Purdon Supp. 1981-
1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-43 (1969); S.C. CODE § 33-13-150 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. §
48-813 (Repl. Vol. 1979).
The American Bar Association adopted § 35 of the Model Business Corporation Act in an
effort to produce a workable, uniform codification of the standard of care owed by directors
to the corporation. Section 35 serves as a guide to directors of corporations and also to
states in drafting corporate legislation. See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr § 35 (1975).
See also ABA, Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW, 1595, 1604 (1978); Arsht, Fi-
duciary Responsibilities of Directors, Officers and Key Employees, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 652,
662 (1979) [hereinafter Arsht, Fiduciary Responsibilities]; Veasey, Directors' Standard of
Care Under Section 35 of the Model Business Corporation Act, 4 DEL. J. CoR. L. 665
(1979).
27. 82 N.Y. 65 (1880).
28. Id. at 71. See also Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1890) (national bank went bank-
rupt 90 days after defendant-directors elected to manage bank).
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them to bear in the discharge of his duties."29 When the director uses
such care and prudence in making his or her decision, the business judg-
ment rule shields that decision from scrutiny by the courts.30
In addition to exercising due care, a director has certain fiduciary du-
ties which require good faith and fair dealing.3' Some commentators
speak of this as a "duty of loyalty."3 2 In Guth v. Loft, 3 the Delaware
Supreme Court stated:
The duty of loyalty requires the director not only affirmatively to protect
the interests of the corporation committed to his charge, but also to refrain
from doing anything that would work injury to the corporation, or to de-
prive it of profit or advantage which his skill and ability might properly
bring to it, or to enable it to make in the reasonable and lawful exercise of
its powers. The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the
corporation demands that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-
interest.3'
Thus, where a director is likely to benefit personally from a decision
made by the board, his or her business judgment may be affected by that
interest. If it is, the director as an individual, rather than as one serving
the corporate best interest, will have governed the decision. Therefore the
breach of fiduciary duty precludes application of the business judgment
rule.35
Claims against a corporation or its directors may be asserted directly
by a shareholder, based on his membership contract with the corpora-
tion.36 Suit may be brought by the shareholder individually or on behalf
of himself and those of his class who are similarly situated.37 A cause of
action arises when directors breach their duty of care or their fiduciary
duties to the corporation and its shareholders.3 8 In bringing suit, share-
29. 82 N.Y. at 74.
30. Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 643 (1944).
31. H. HENN, supra note 1, at 457-59.
32. Arsht, Business Judgment, supra note 6, at 115.
33. 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939) (Loft's corporate funds used to build up two corpo-
rations owned by Guth, vice-president of Loft and controlling voice on Loft board of
directors).
34. Id. at 270, 5 A.2d at 510.
35. H. HENN, supra note 1, at 459.
36. Id. at 740. This contract is based on a theory of corporate personality whereby incor-
poration is deemed to involve contracts among the members, between the members and the
corporation, and between the members of the corporation and the state. Id. at 109. The
corporation acts through its board of directors.
37. Id. at 755-59. Direct suit involves the enforcement by a shareholder of a cause of
action, belonging to him on the basis of his membership contract, against the corporation or
others. This suit is distinguished from a derivative suit which brings an action on behalf of
the corporation itself by a shareholder where harm has been done to the corporation and the
corporation has failed to enforce such a claim directly. Id.
38. See notes 17-35 supra and accompanying text.
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holders must allege that the directors were involved in a decision which
affected the corporation and which resulted in some corporate injury or
loss. Directors then may answer by pleading the business judgment rule
as an affirmative defense.3 9
To successfully invoke the defense provided by the rule, a director
must have exercised reasonable care in obtaining relevant and available
facts before making his decision in a transaction.40 He also must be acting
in the good faith belief that the transaction is in the best interests of the
corporation. Further, there must be no fraud, self-dealing, or other per-
sonal interest of the directors authorizing the transaction.42 Once raised
as a shield to the director's liability, the business judgment rule guides
the court's inquiry into the conduct of the directors. 2
B. Burden of Proof for Business Judgment Rule
Most courts place the burden of proof on the plaintiff-shareholders to
show that the directors' decision does not warrant the protection of the
business judgment rule defense.43 Once the defense provided by the rule
is affirmatively pleaded by the directors of the corporation, a presumption
arises in their favor that the questioned decision was made with due care
and based on the exercise of good business judgment.44 The presumption
is rebuttable, but the attacking party must present credible evidence to
support a conclusion that care was not taken by directors in considering
all relevant facts and business advice presented to them or that their de-
cision has no reasonable or rational basis.45 Such evidence may show that
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a), (c). See also Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. at
1174.
40. The duty to obtain relevant and available facts is embodied in the directors' duty to
exercise due care. See notes 27-30 supra and accompanying text. Reliance on advice of both
legal and business investment counsel may be essential to gathering knowledge to make an
informed careful decision. Accord, Spirt v. Bechtel, 232 F.2d 241, 247 (2d Cir. 1956). See
also Voege v. Magnavox Co., 439 F. Supp. 935 (D. Del. 1977); Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid
Co., 341 F. Supp. 240, 244 (D. Neb. 1972), af'd, 473 F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1973); Arsht, Busi-
ness Judgment, supra note 6, at 111-12.
41. These requirements are embodied in the directors' fiduciary duties. See notes 31-35
supra and accompanying text. See also Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d at 510; Arsht, Business Judg-
ment, supra note 6, at 111.
42. Arsht, Business Judgment, supra note 6, at 114.
43. Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 381 (2d Cir. 1980); Crouse-Hinds Co. v.
InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 702 (2d Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292
(3d Cir. 1980); Warshaw v. Calhoun, 43 Del. Ch. 148, _, 221 A.2d 487, 493 (1966).
44. See Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 381 (2d Cir. 1980); Crouse-Hinds Co.
v. InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 702 (2d Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287,
292 (3d Cir. 1980); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
45. See, e.g., Marks v. Wolfson, 41 Del. Ch. 115, 188 A.2d 680 (1963). Cf. Kaplan v. Gold-
saint, 380 A.2d 556 (Del. Ch. 1977) (presumption not disturbed if any rational business pur-
pose can be attributed to decision); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del.
1971) (decision not disturbed if attributable to a rational business purpose).
[Vol. 16:405
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the directors did not act in light of their actual knowledge or the knowl-
edge that they should have gained by reasonable care and skill.46 Reliance
on both business and legal advice is included in this requirement.47 Negli-
gently made decisions which breach this standard of care are not pro-
tected by the business judgment rule."
Additionally, to overcome the business judgment defense the plaintiff-
shareholders must show a lack of good faith through self-dealing or per-
sonal interest on the part of the directors. 49 A showing of personal inter-
est in the decision effectively demonstrates to the court that the transac-
tion based on the judgment of the directors was made not in the best
interests of the corporation, but rather in the best interests of the direc-
tors." Therefore, to remove the defense and rebut the presumption of a
good faith exercise of sound business judgment,51 the shareholders must
present evidence of "fraud or gross overreaching," 52 "bad faith or abuse of
discretion,"5 3 "profit at the expense of the corporation," or "improper
motive ... or a reckless indifference to or a deliberate disregard of the
stockholders." 55
Such criteria are generally vague and overbroad, and the courts often
do not clearly articulate the measuring standards as to what constitutes
fraud, bad faith, or self-dealing.56 However, when the challenging stock-
holders satisfy the court that personal interests of the directors are in-
volved and that such interests interfere with the exercise of sound busi-
ness judgment, the presumption and deference to the business judgment
of the directors are no longer present and the business judgment rule is
vitiated.57
46. H. HENN, supra note 1, at 455.
47. Id. at 458. See also N. LArrIn, supra note 14, at 247. Accord, Sprit v. Bechtel, 232
F.2d 241, 247 (2d Cir. 1956).
48. H. HENN, supra note 1, at 457.
49. See note 43 supra. See also Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, , 199 A.2d 548, 654
(1964).
50. See generally Arsht, Business Judgment, supra note 6, at 115-16.
51. The courts articulate a presumption of good faith and fair dealing in favor of the
directors. See, e.g., Warshaw v. Calhoun, 43 Del. Ch. 148, - 221 A.2d 487, 493 (1966) (acts
of directors presumed taken in good faith and inspired by best interests of corporation);
Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, _ 199 A.2d 548, 554 (1964) (decisions initially presumed
to be in good faith). However, one commentator states that no presumption is raised regard-
ing personal interests of directors. Arsht, Business Judgment, supra note 6, at 116.
52. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 722 (Del. 1971); Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil
Co., 267 A.2d 883, 887 (Del. 1970), revog 255 A.2d 717 (Del. Ch. 1969); Meyerson v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co., 246 A.2d 789, 794 (Del. CIL 1967).
53. Warshaw v. Calhoun, 43 Del. Ch. 148, -, 221 A.2d 487, 493 (1966).
54. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1256 (Del. Ch. 1980).
55. Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co., 16 Del. Ch. 318, , 147 A. 257, 261 (1929).
56. See, e.g., Issner v. Aldrich, 254 F. Supp. 696 (D. Del. 1966); Chasin v. Gluck, 282 A.2d
188 (Del. Ch. 1971). See generally Arsht, Fiduciary Responsibilities, supra note 26, at 655.
57. See note 43 supra and accompanying text. When the presumption is rebutted, the
1982]
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In summary, the business judgment rule is a defense traditionally used
to protect corporate directors from personal liability where their decisions
involve an honest mistake in business judgment which results in injury to
the shareholders or to the corporation.58 The initial burden of proof is on
the challenger to rebut the presumption that the directors' decisions were
made with due care, in good faith, and in the best interests of the corpo-
ration. 59 The court will not interfere with the business judgment of direc-
tors absent a showing of self-dealing, bad faith, fraud, or personal
interest.60
II. APPLICATION OF THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE IN Panter v.
Marshall Field & Co."'
A. Background of the Marshall Field Decision
The Marshall Field case involved a challenge to the rejection by Field's
board of directors of a take-over bid which would have profitted Field's
shareholders. The suit was brought by twenty-one shareholders of Mar-
shall Field & Company,62 a Delaware corporation whose home office and
principal place of business are in Chicago, Illinois. The defendants were
ten directors of the Marshall Field Company. Seven of the defendant-
directors were not affiliated with Field's management; the remaining
three were corporate officers.
On several occasions in the late 1960's and early to mid-1970's, Field's
management was approached by would-be merger or take-over "suit-
ors." ' All proposals were rejected by the board. In 1969, Marshall Field
hired Joseph H. Flom," an attorney with expertise in the area of corpo-
burden of proof shifts to the directors to show that the transaction is intrinsically fair to the
shareholders and to the corporation. The directors' burden of proof is called the intrinsic
fairness test. This test has been applied primarily to situations involving parent-subsidiary
corporations, purchases where the price is inadequate, or corporations which have common
directors. See notes 184-87 infra and accompanying text.
58. See note 8 supra; text accompanying notes 43-55 supra.
59. See note 43 supra.
60. See notes 31-35 supra and accompanying text.
61. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981), affg 486 F. Supp. 1168 (N.D. IlM. 1980).
62. Marshall Field & Company is a retail corporation which sells general merchandise,
apparel, and furniture through its department stores. By the end of 1976, it was the eighth
largest department store chain in the United States. It is a publicly held corporation with
more than 16,000 shareholders who have purchased in excess of 9,000,000 shares of common
stock. 486 F. Supp. at 1174.
63. Marshall Field was approached in 1969 by Associated Dry Goods; in 1975 by Feder-
ated Department Stores; in August, 1976, by Dayton-Hudson; and in September, 1976, by
Gamble-Skogmo. All of these proposals were evaluated by Field's directors and turned
down. 646 F.2d at 278.
64. Flom was hired from the New York law firm of Skadden, Arps, Slak, Meagher &
Flom. He is reputed to be the country's most famous take-over lawyer. Feinberg, The Direc-
tors' New Dilemma, The Takeover Crisis: A Special Report, 13 INsTrr. INv. 33, 45 (June
PANTER v. MARSHALL FIELD & CO.
rate mergers, to advise the company in determining how best to respond
to the overtures of interested parties.
In 1977, Carter Hawley Hale (CHH)65 made several informal contacts
with Marshall Field expressing an interest in a merger. The board re-
solved not to consider the merger, but CHH continued to press its atten-
tions. Field's legal counsel 6 began to investigate the antitrust aspects of
such a merger and advised the company's board of directors that the pro-
posed combination would be illegal.67
On December 10, 1977, the president of CHH called the president of
Marshall Field to inform him that unless the company agreed to negoti-
ate a merger by Monday, December 12, CHH would submit a public ex-
change proposals to the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) which
would make Field's stock worth approximately $36.00 per share. Field's
stock was trading at roughly $22.00 per share at the time. The call was
construed as an unfriendly take-over attempt09
As a result, a special meeting of Field's board of directors was called at
which the directors adopted several defensive tactics. Pursuant to the ad-
vice of legal counsel, the board authorized the filing of an antitrust suit
against CHH. Based on the advice of Field's investment bankers that fu-
1979). Flom advised Field's directors how best to fend off "raiders" and was allegedly part
of their secret policy of independence. See notes 110-15 infra and accompanying text.
65. Carter Hawley Hale operates retail department, specialty, and book stores. CHH's
Neiman-Marcus division operates retail stores in Texas and the southeastern United States.
66. Field's board of directors had been advised since 1971 by antitrust counsel from Kirk-
land & Ellis, a Chicago law firm. 646 F.2d at 279.
67. The Clayton Act prohibits acquisitions by a corporation of the stock or assets of an-
other corporation tending substantially to lessen competition in any line of commerce. Clay-
ton Act of 1914, § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976) (original version at ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 713
(1914)). A merger between Marshall Field and CHH would tend to lessen competition in the
retail department store business. The two companies had stores located near each other and
carried on essentially the same business. See notes 62, 65 supra.
68. In an exchange proposal, the offeror proposes to issue either its common or preferred
stock in exchange for stock of the target corporation and to publish the offer pursuant to
the publicity, registration and filing requirements of the Securities Act of 1933. E. Aamow
& H. EINHORN, supra note 2, at 29.
69. The district court defined an unfriendly take-over as follows:
[A takeover] is unfriendly when the target company is the object of acquisition by a
raider who, complying with state and federal securities laws, makes the required dis-
closures and proposes an exchange or tender offer for the number of outstanding
common shares of the company that will result in control of the target. A takeover,
when unfriendly, has a disruptive effect on the management of a target company and
its board of directors. It may be welcomed by some, but not all of the target com-
pany's shareholders. A takeover can be expensive; it often raises questions of possible
violations of the antitrust laws; and it presents problems under the securities statutes
and the rules and regulations adopted thereunder. Consequently, a company vulnera-
ble to a takeover must have guidance from lawyers, investment bankers, accountants,
and business consultants.
486 F. Supp. at 1175.
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ture performance of the company would be favorable, the board deter-
mined that the company's stock could bring more than $36.00 a share in a
sale or merger of the company.70 The directors therefore voted unani-
mously to reject the CHH merger proposal because, in their judgment,
the merger would be "illegal, inadequate, and not in the best interests of
the corporation, the stockholders, and the community which it serves."'
Marshall Field subsequently issued a press release conveying its deci-
sion and outlining growth plans. Stock traded that day in a range of
$28.00 to $32.00. On December 20, 1977, Field's president addressed a
letter to Field's stockholders in which he expressed optimism about the
company's future. In the regular January board meeting, the directors of
Marshall Field resolved to pursue two expansion programs, one in Hous-
ton, Texas, where CHH also had a store, and one in the Pacific Northwest
involving five stores. On February 1, 1978, CHH announced its intentions
to make an exchange offer of $42.00. Appropriate documents were filed
with the SEC for a tender offer.7 2 Field's board met subsequently and,
once again, affirmed its opposition to merger. The market price of Field's
stock rose to $34.00 and fluctuated between $30.00 and $34.00 during this
period. On February 8, 1978, Marshall Field announced the acquisition of
the Houston store which complicated the antitrust problems of CHH's
merger proposal because CHH already had a store in the same shopping
mall.73 On February 22, CHH announced withdrawal of its proposed
tender offer before it became effective. 4 Following this announcement,
the market price of Field's shares dropped to $19.00.
The shareholder-plaintiffs subsequently filed suit in Federal District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois75 seeking to enjoin Field's di-
rectors from engaging in their "policy of independence"76 and requesting
70. The CHH merger team had noted to one of Field's directors and to Field's president
that a foreign firm was likely to make a $60.00 tender offer for Field's stock "at any time."
646 F.2d at 279.
71. Id. at 280.
72. A person, corporation, or group of persons making a tender offer, which could result
in the offeror owning more than five per cent of certain securities, is required to file a basic
disclosure statement under Schedule 13D, promulgated pursuant to the rulemaking author-
ity granted the SEC under Section 13(d)(1) of the Williams Act. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101
(1968). See also E. ARA ow & H. EINHORN, supra note 2, at 77.
73. The Houston store was located in Galleria, a Houston shopping mall which already
contained a CHH owned Neiman-Marcus store. 646 F.2d at 280.
74. Tender offers which are proposed may be withdrawn at any time by the offeror before
they become effective. The date and time of effectiveness of the tender offer should be
clearly stated in the invitation by the offeror. E. ARANow & H. EINHORN, supra note 2, at 46-
52.
75. 486 F. Supp. 1168 (N.D. IMI. 1980).
76. This policy was alleged to have been kept secret by Field's directors in order for them
to retain their control of the corporation and reject all merger or take-over attempts. Id. at
1173.
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damages incurred during the period from December 12, 1977, to February
11, 1978. The shareholders alleged that Field's directors had breached
their fiduciary duty and had intentionally interfered with prospective eco-
nomic advantage.7 7 The district court empaneled a jury to try the case.78
At the end of the plaintiffs' evidence, the court granted the defendants'
motion for a directed verdict" concluding that "plaintiffs' evidence, con-
sidered together with all reasonable inferences favorable to them, totally
fails to prove necessary elements of their claims."80 The plaintiffs ap-
pealed the verdict to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals."
B. The Circuit Court's Decision and Rationale
On appeal, the plaintiffs sought to establish two violations of state law.
First, they contended that the defendant-directors breached their fiduci-
ary duty to the corporation and its shareholders (1) by adopting a secret
policy to resist acquisitions, regardless of benefit to the shareholders or
the corporation; (2) by failing to disclose the existence of such a policy;
77. Additional claims were brought under the Williams Act, ch. 404, § 10, 48 Stat. 891
(1934) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976) and the SEC rules. Plaintiffs alleged
violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1976) and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980) promulgated under this Act by the
Securities Exchange Commission. The court dismissed these claims for the following
reasons:
(a) Upon the announcement of a tender offer proposal a target company shareholder may
retain his shares, tender them if the offer becomes effective, or dispose of them on the mar-
ket. Because the CHH tender offer was withdrawn before it became effective, the plaintiffs
had no opportunity to decide whether to tender. Therefore, it was impossible for them to
have relied on any statement. The element of reliance is vital to a Williams Act § 14(e)
claim. 646 F.2d at 283-84 (citing Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
101 S. Ct. 354 (1980).
(b) SEC Rule 10b-5 requires proof of manipulation or deception on the part of the defen-
dants. The plaintiffs' allegations and evidence concerning the policy of independence, the
press releases and letters by Field's, the filing of an antitrust suit, the defensive acquisitions,
and the misleading projections were not sufficient for a finding of manipulation or decep-
tion. 646 F.2d at 287-93.
To hear the state claims, the court exercised its pendent jurisdiction. See United Mine
Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725-26 (1966) (If state and federal claims are
derived from a common nucleus of fact and are such as would ordinarily all be tried in one
judicial proceeding, the federal court, in its discretion, will hear the whole.).
78. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(a). See Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959);
Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
79. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a).
80. 486 F. Supp. at 1195. The court explained that "the facts established by the proof
... pointed so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of the defendants" that no reasonable
jury could arrive at a contrary verdict. Id. The decisions were made in the exercise of busi-
ness judgment. Id. at 1193.
81. The Seventh Circuit also dismissed the plaintiffs' federal securities law claims. The
court noted that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does not provide a remedy for the
breach of fiduciary duty owed by a director to his corporation and its shareholders under
state law. 646 F.2d at 287 (citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977)).
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(3) by making defensive acquisitions;"2 and (4) by filing an antitrust suit
against CHH.ss Second, the plaintiff-shareholders alleged that the defen-
dants interfered with their prospective economi advantage in that the
directors' purported wrongful behavior caused CHH to withdraw its pro-
posed tender offer before it became effective.""
The focal point of the court's decision is the business judgment rule.
Because Marshall Field & Company is a Delaware corporation, Delaware
law was applied. 5 Thus the appropriate starting point for analysis was
the articulation of the business judgment rule under Delaware law. 6
The first issue addressed by the court was whether to apply the busi-
ness judgment rule where a breach of fiduciary duty is alleged. This
fiduciary duty is discharged by directors "when in good faith they exer-
cise business judgment in making decisions regarding the corporation. '8 7
Good faith and fair dealing are essential to the fidudiary duty concept.s
"When [directors] act in good faith, they enjoy a presumption of sound
business judgment, reposed in them as directors, which courts will not
disturb if any rational business purpose can be attributed to their deci-
sions."8 9 To rebut this presumption, the plaintiffs had to establish a
prima facie case of lack of good faith by showing fraud, self-dealing, or
abuse of discretion.90 Field's shareholders contended that the secret pol-
icy to resist takeovers, the failure to disclose such a policy, the defensive
82. The defensive acquisitions referred to were the stores which Field's board of directors
voted to acquire in pursuance of its expansion program. This included five stores in the
Pacific Northwest and one store in Houston, Texas. 646 F.2d at 280.
83. Id. at 293.
84. This violation of state law is based on a tort theory. Id. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 130 (4th ed. 1971).
85. The federal courts apply state law for substantive state law claims. Therefore, the
court applied Illinois law concerning the conflict of law, which requires that the law of the
state of incorporation be applied where the issues concern internal corporate affairs, duties
and liabilities. Field's is incorporated in Delaware. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAws §§ 303-04 (1971); R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICrS OF LAW §§ 251, 254 (3d ed. 1977).
See, e.g., Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 728 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1017 (1980); Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947).
86. The court of appeals adopted the district court's articulation of the business judgment
rule under Delaware law:
Directors of corporations discharge their fiduciary duties when in good faith they
exercise business judgment in making decisions regarding the corporation. When they
act in good faith, they enjoy a presumption of sound business judgment, reposed in
them as directors, which courts will not disturb if any rational business purpose can
be attributed to their decisions. In the absence of fraud, bad faith, gross overreaching
or abuse of discretion, courts will not interfere with the exercise of business judgment
by corporate directors.
486 F. Supp. at 1194 (citations omitted).
87. 646 F.2d at 293.
88. See notes 31-35 supra and accompanying text.
89. 646 F.2d at 293.
90. Id. See also notes 49-57 supra and accompanying text.
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acquisitions, and the antitrust suit were evidence of a desire on the part
of the directors to retain control of the corporation.91 Thus, the plaintiff-
shareholders reasoned that a motive to retain control demonstrated bad
faith by directors and rebutted the presumption that their actions were
taken in the exercise of sound business judgment.2 Therefore, the plain-
tiffs argued that the burden of proof should have been placed on the de-
fendant-directors to show the compelling business purpose of the
transactions. 9 3
In rejecting the argument of the shareholders, the court turned to
Johnson v. Trueblood,94 a recent Third Circuit case involving allegations
of a purpose to retain control of a corporation. The Third Circuit held
that the showing of a motive to retain control was not enough to shift the
burden of proof to the directors and that the plaintiff at least must show
that the retention of control was the defendant's sole or primary motive
in order to rebut the presumption of a rational business purpose.9 5 In
Johnson the court explained that directors are not ordinary fiduciaries97
because "by the very nature of corporate life a director has a certain
amount of self-interest in everything he does."98 The court reasoned that
the business judgment rule alleviates this problem by protecting the di-
rector in situations that would involve a conflict of interest for the ordi-
nary fiduciary.9 The plaintiff bears the burden of showing that "imper-
missible motives predominated;"100 if the plaintiff fails to meet that
91. If this were proven, the shareholders would have shown self-dealing by the directors
and the burden would have shifted to them to show the intrinsic fairness of the transaction.
See note 57 supra.
92. 646 F.2d at 294.
93. Id. at 295.
94. 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980).
95. Id. at 293. The requirement of "sole or primary" motive was first articulated in Cheff
v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, -, 119 A.2d 548, 554 (1964). The Third Circuit also relied on
Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (1962) (directors' actions improper because
done for no reason other than to maintain control) and Petty v. Penntech Papers, Inc., 347
A.2d 140, 143 (Del. Ch. 1975) (use of corporate funds to redeem shares improper because
done primarily to maintain management's control).
96. The Seventh Circuit stressed this opinion presumably because Delaware is in the
Third Circuit, which may be more attuned to Delaware corporate law. The court also noted
that Judge Seitz who wrote the Johnson opinion was formerly a Delaware Chancellor. 646
F.2d at 293-94.
97. "[A]n ordinary fiduciary may not have the slightest conflict of interest in any transac-
tion he undertakes on behalf of the trust." 629 F.2d at 292. See also Godbold v. Branch
Bank, 11 Ala. 191, 199 (1847) (if held to extreme standards, "no man of ordinary prudence
would accept a trust . .
98. 629 F.2d at 292.
99. Id. "[I]f actions are arguably taken for the benefit of the corporation, then the direc-
tors are presumed to have been exercising sound business judgment rather than responding
to any personal motivations." Id. See notes 49-57 supra and accompanying text. See also
note 97 supra.
100. 629 F.2d at 292.
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burden, the court will presume the defendant-directors exercised their
business judgment in good faith. 0 1 To allow merely the presence of a mo-
tive to retain control by corporate directors to shift the burden of proof is
contrary to the purpose of the rule, since, as the Third Circuit noted,
control is always arguably a motive in any corporate action. Thus, to al-
low plaintiffs to use this theory would always undercut the business judg-
ment rule.102 The Marshall Field court adopted this rationale and bol-
stered it by stating that the presumption of the exercise of business
judgment in good faith is further heightened where "the majority of the
board consists of independent outside directors."103
The court also relied on the Second Circuit's decisions in Treadway
Cos. v. Care Corp.04 and Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc.,20 5 both
cases involving control motivation on the part of defendant-directors in
take-over attempts. An allegation of control motivation not supported by
proof was found insufficient to shift the burden to the defendants. 106 The
Second Circuit stated in both cases that it is necessary for the plaintiff to
initially prove the control motivation in order to demonstrate the self-
interest of the defendant-directors before the burden of proof shifts to
the directors.107 Following the holdings and rationale of these cases and
proceeding under the business judgment rule, the Seventh Circuit in
Marshall Field refused to apply the plaintiff-shareholders' proposal that
"the burden be placed upon the directors to establish the compelling bus-
iness purpose of any transaction which would have the effect of consoli-
dating or retaining the directors' control." 0
After deciding that the business judgment rule does apply to allega-
tions of a breach of fiduciary duties, the court turned to the four specific
claims of breach to review the sufficiency of the shareholders' evidence of
bad faith or self-dealing necessary to vitiate the business judgment de-
fense. 09 First, plaintiffs contended that they presented sufficient evidence
as to the existence of a secret policy of Field's directors to remain inde-
pendent for a jury to decide whether this policy demonstrated the self-
dealing or personal interest which breaches the directors' fiduciary duties.
The shareholders relied on the directors' history of resistance to prior ap-
101. Id. at 292-93.
102. Id.
103. 646 F.2d at 294.
104. 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980).
105. 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980).
106. 638 F.2d at 382; 634 F.2d at 702.
107. 638 F.2d at 382; 634 F.2d at 702.
108. The court called this proposal alternately a "different test," a "novel rule," and a
"novel theory of directors' liability." In declining to shift the burden of proof to the direc-
tors, the court stated that it was using the "well-established test" of the business judgment
rule. 646 F.2d at 295.
109. See notes 82, 90 supra and accompanying text.
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proaches.110 The court stated that the evaluation and response to such
approaches was "within the scope of the directors' duties." ' The evi-
dence indicated that the directors carefully considered each merger pro-
posal."12 The desire to build value within the company and the belief that
a take-over might diminish the company's value were viewed by the Sev-
enth Circuit as rational business purposes.1 s The shareholders had
"failed to introduce evidence supporting a reasonable inference that any
of the rejections of these approaches were made in bad faith.1 1 4 The
court also found it unreasonable to infer the existence of a policy of inde-
pendence.11 5 Therefore, the court did not disturb the business judgment
of the directors and a directed verdict was properly granted.116
Second, plaintiffs contended that failure to reveal the policy of inde-
pendence "amounted to a breach of fiduciary duty."'1 Citing Berman v.
Gerber Products Co.,""8 the court stated that the directors were under no
duty to reveal every approach made to Marshall Field.1 9 Since there is no
duty to disclose prior take-over approaches, there can be liability for a
failure to disclose a policy of resistance, especially where no such policy
can be reasonably inferred to exist. 20 Noting the defensive acquisitions of
the stores in the Pacific Northwest and of the store in Houston, the court
chided the shareholders for trying to impose liability through "Monday-
morning-quarterbacking. 1 $ 21 .
In their third specific claim for breach of fiduciary duty, the sharehold-
110. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
111. 646 F.2d at 296.
112. The district court found that each time an approach was made by a company to
acquire Field's, the contacts with the approaching company were made part of Field's
records by signed or initialed memoranda, and the directors' actions were recorded in board
minutes documenting resolutions taken. The directors "reached their decision [in each case]
only after consultation with management, lawyers, accountants, and investment bankers."
486 F. Supp. at 1193.
113. 646 F.2d at 296.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 297.
116. Id. at 296.
117. The court refused to allow the shareholders to delve into the minds of the directors
in situations where none of the prior attempts at take-over ever became definite offers or
merger proposals. Since the directors exercised due care in their decisions, the court applied
the business judgment rule. Id. at 296-97. Cf. Goldberger v. Baker, 442 F. Supp. 659, 664
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (actionable deception must allege more than mere failure to disclose unfair-
ness of transaction).
118. 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1318 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
119. 646 F.2d at 296 (citing also Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. H. K. Porter Co., 535
F.2d 388, 398 (8th Cir. 1976)).
120. 646 F.2d at 297. Accord, Vaughn v. Teledyne, 628 F.2d 1214, 1221 (9th Cir. 1980).
121. The court points out that hindsight is always perfect vision, and that two of the
stores are now unprofitable matters not if the directors exercised sound business judgment
in good faith when they decided to acquire the stores. 646 F.2d at 297.
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ers contended that two of the stores acquired were not profitable, 22 that
the transactions to acquire them were unfavorable to the stockholders,
and that the motive in acquiring the stores was to make the company less
attractive as a take-over target and to exacerbate antitrust problems. 2 If
supported by evidence and proven, these claims would demonstrate that
the directors did not act in the best interests of the corporation, thereby
breaching their fiduciary duty. The court found, however, that the evi-
dence was uncontroverted that Field's expansion programs were reasona-
ble, natural, and not designed to make the company less attractive as an
acquisition.224 The business judgment rule protects directors from attack
when they make a transaction in good faith which proves later to be un-
profitable.1 25 The court went on to say that even if the desire to fend off
CHH were among the motives of the board of directors in acquiring the
stores, the plaintiffs failed to establish it as the sole or primary purpose,
as required by Cheff v. Mathes,1 26 in order to show self-dealing or per-
sonal interest sufficient to overcome the business judgment rule.12 7
The fourth specific claim of breach of fiduciary duty concerned the
filing of the antitrust suit against CHH by Field's directors. The plaintiffs
alleged that the suit was motivated by the policy to resist take-overs and
remain independent, and, therefore, was in the interest of the directors
and not of the corporation.128 Citing Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. v.
Great A & P Tea Co.,129 the court stated that it is the duty of the direc-
tors to file an antitrust suit when in their business judgment a proposed
combination would be illegal or otherwise detrimental to the corpora-
tion. 30 Bringing the suit served the rational business purpose of protect-
122. The plaintiff-shareholders complained that, even as of January 20, 1978, the direc-
tors considered two of the five stores in the Pacific Northwest to be "dogs" or unprofitable
ventures. Id. at 291.
123. Id. at 297.
124. Id. Field's executives and directors had long considered expansion in the Pacific
Northwest and in Texas. This interest was well known to investment analysts in the depart-
ment store field. Id. at 280.
125. See notes 8-13 supra and accompanying text.
126. 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964). Cheff was the first case to articulate the "sole
or primary motive" test. See also Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556 (Del. Ch. 1977); Baron
v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. 337 A.2d 653 (Del. Ch. 1975); Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch.
14, 187 A.2d 405 (1962); Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47, 158 A.2d 136 (1960).
127. See notes 31-35 and 51-57 supra and accompanying text. According to one commen-
tator, one of the most prevalent forms of bad faith is an improper attempt by directors to
keep themselves in office. The business judgment rule will not shield directors shown to
have made a transaction solely or primarily to retain their control, even if the action were in
the best interests of the company at the time. However, if control is merely incidental to the
transaction, the directors are protected by using their business judgment. Arsht, Business
Judgment, supra note 6, at 127-28.
128. 486 F. Supp. at 1192.
129. 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973).
130. 646 F.2d at 297.
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ing Marshall Field from the damage that forced divestiture313 would
cause. 32 The decision to file an antitrust suit is within the scope of the
business judgment rule, and there was substantial evidence that the de-
fendant-directors were fairly and reasonably exercising their business
judgment in filing suit. The directors relied on the advice of experienced
and knowledgeable antitrust counsel in initiating the suit.'3 ' In addition,
one member of the board was an experienced antitrust lawyer who could
evaluate the soundness of the advice and the action taken.'" With no
evidence that the suit was brought in bad faith, the defendant-directors'
desire to perpetuate control was not sufficient to set aside the business
judgment defense."s 5
As to all of the plaintiff-stockholders' claims for breach of fiduciary
duty, the court concluded that there was insufficient evidence on which a
jury could base a rational verdict that the defendant-directors breached
any duty. Thus, in applying the business judgment rule, the court af-
firmed the district court's decision.1"6
The plaintiff-shareholders' second claim of violation of state law in-
volved intentional interference with their prospective economic advan-
tage. Based on contractual relationships,"37 this claim seeks damages for
wrongful conduct which resultS in injury to economic benefits expected by
131. The Clayton Act of 1914 gives federal district courts the power to impose civil reme-
dies for violations. 15 U.S.C. § 9 (1976) (original version at ch. 349, § 74, 28 Stat. 570
(1894)); 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976) (original version at ch. 323, § 738, 38 Stat. 731 (1914)); 15
U.S.C. § 21 (1976) (original version at ch. 323, § 11, 38 Stat. 734 (1914)). The courts may
order the corporation to divest itself of property, securities or other investments as a rem-
edy for violations. United States v. E. L Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961).
This may be accomplished by separating the going business into two independent enter-
prises or by means of a spin-off. See E. ROCKEFELLER, ANTITRUST QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
240-54 (1974). See also R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 78-95 (1976).
132. 646 F.2d at 297.
133. Id. at 279. Accord, Spirt v. Bechtel, 232 F.2d 241, 247 (2d Cir. 1956). Reliance on
advice is an element in the duty of due care when exercising business judgment. See notes
45-48 supra and accompanying text. Field's antitrust counsel began its investigation on
November 16, 1977. On December 2, 1977, they advised Field's management that in their
opinion the proposed combination would be illegal in light of (1) competition between
Field's and Neiman-Marcus' stores already in the Chicago area, (2) potential competition
between Field's Chicago stores and proposed Neiman-Marcus stores, and (3) existing com-
petition between Field's stores which were second in book sales in Chicago and CHH's
Walden division book stores. 646 F.2d at 279.
134. 646 F.2d at 297.
135. Id. at 298. The decision of the directors to resolve the antitrust question through
litigation in federal court rather than to utilize some other method was within their discre-
tion. Id. at 297-98. See also Gulf & Western Indus., Inc. v. Great A & P Tea Co., 476 F.2d
687, 698 (2d Cir. 1973); Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693, 696 (Del. Ch. 1971); Kors v. Carey,
39 Del. Ch. 47, _, 158 A.2d 136, 140 (1960).
136. 646 F.2d at 298.
137. See note 36 supra.
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the plaintiff in the future.13 8 To sustain such a charge, Illinois law '39 re-
quires proof that the defendants acted with the purpose of injuring the
plaintiff's expectancies in future profits or economic benefit. 140 This
means that the directors' acts must involve some fraud, overreaching, or
malicious conduct intentionally interfering with the plaintiffs' business
affairs.1 41
The evidence in Marshall Field showed that the directors were acting
on good faith motives with the well-being of the corporation in mind,""
and not acting to intentionally decrease the price of stock in order to
deprive the shareholders of profits. Absent sufficient evidence of improper
motives on the part of the directors to overcome the business judgment
defense in an action for breach of fiduciary duty, "a case cannot proceed
to the jury on an interference with prospective economic opportunity the-
ory.1143 As to both claims, the plaintiff-shareholders needed to show im-
proper motives such as fraud, self-dealing, or bad faith on the part of the
directors.
C. The Dissent
Judge Cudahy, concurring in part 44 and dissenting in part, felt that
there was "abundant evidence in this case to go to the jury on the state
claims for breach of fiduciary duty. 145 He "emphatically disagree[d] that
the business judgment rule should clothe directors . . .with an almost
irrebuttable presumption of sound business judgment, prevailing over
everything but the elusive hobgoblins of fraud, bad faith or abuse of dis-
cretion. 1 4' The majority, he maintained, had adopted an approach which
would immunize a target company's board of directors if they were able
to assemble a sufficiently prestigious contingent of financial and legal ad-
138. W. PROSSER, supra note 84, § 130 at 950-53.
139. Delaware courts hold that the law of the place of the tort governs in actions such as
this. 646 F.2d at 298 n.10 (citing Bowl-Mor Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 297 A.2d 61, 64 n.2 (Del.
Ch. 1972)). The court in Marshall Field then looked to Illinois law and commented that
both Illinois and Delaware had the same substantive law for this tort action. 646 F.2d at 298
n.10.
140. 646 F.2d at 298. See Herman v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 41 Ill. 2d 468, -, 244
N.E.2d 809, 812 (1969); Crinkley v. Dow Jones & Co., 67 Ill. App. 3d 869, -, 385 N.E.2d
714, 722 (1978); Parkway Bank & Trust Co. v. City of Darien, 43 Ill. App. 3d 400, -, 357
N.E.2d 211, 215 (1976).
141. 646 F.2d at 298 (citing City of Rock Falls v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 13 IlM. App.
3d 359, -, 300 N.E.2d 331, 333 (1973)).
142. 646 F.2d at 298.
143. Id. at 299.
144. Although he dissented on the state claims for breach of fiduciary duty, Circuit Judge
Cudahy agreed with the majority's opinion concerning the Securities Act misrepresentation
claims. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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visors who would later provide rational business reasons for their
decisions.1
47
The dissent distinguished the task of managing the business affairs of a
corporation from the collection and distribution of corporate profits and
losses ' 8 and took the view that courts should intervene in situations
where these profits and losses and their collection and distribution in-
volve the corporation-shareholder relationship.14 9 The dissent focused on
the potential for abuse and the threat of the self-protective viewpoint of
interested directors to stockholder welfare where profits are concerned.150
Such self-protective, interested directors could manipulate their business
decisions to their own benefit at the expense of the shareholders' inter-
ests. For example, they could channel expert advice to their own advan-
tage and to the disadvantage of the corporation and the stockholders.15 1
"Directors. .. are, at the very least, 'interested' in their own positions of
power, prestige and prominence."1 5 2 They are "interested" in keeping
their positions and in protecting their management from outside at-
tack."' Because of the directors' interests and special position, the dis-
sent was disturbed by the "slavish application" of the majority's version
of the good faith presumption under the business judgment defense.1 5
The dissent cited Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp.15 5 to underscore the
precept that once a plaintiff demonstrates a director's interest in the
transaction is at issue, the burden shifts to the defendant-directors to
prove the transaction was reasonable and fair to the corporation.25 6 In
Treadway, the directors authorized the issuance and sale of a large block
of stock which had the effect of preserving their control.1 57
147. Id. For a discussion of this aspect of the directors' decision, see Feinberg, supra note
64, at 53-56.
148. 646 F.2d at 299-300.
149. Id. at 300. See Note, Protection for Shareholder Interests in Recapitalizations of
Publicly Held Companies, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1030, 1066 (1958).
150. 646 F.2d at 300.
151. See Gelfond & Sebastian, Reevaluating the Duties of Target Management in the
Hostile Tender Offer, 60 B.U. L. REV. 403, 435-37 (1980); Easterbrook & Fischel, The
Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REv.
1161 (1981).
152. 646 F.2d at 300.
153. Id. at 301. Judge Cudahy put little stock in the fact that a majority of Field's direc-
tors were non-management (independent). He noted that the interaction between manage-
ment and boards of directors is very strong. The directors may be interested in preserving
the control of "their" management and thus their own control. 646 F.2d at 300-01. See
generally Gelfond & Sebastian, supra note 151, at 436.
154. 646 F.2d at 301.
155. 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980).
156. Id. at 382.
157. Judge Cudahy stated:
The issuance and sale of this stock diluted shareholders' votes, which is not at issue
in the case at bar. The Second Circuit found that the Treadway directors were not
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According to the dissent, the burden of proof must be shifted to the
directors when this interest in control is shown.'58 Examining other cases
relied on by the majority, the dissent rejected the Second Circuit's judg-
ment in Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc. 5 " as "inconsistent with ap-
posite case law, corporate reality and sound public policy" to the extent
that the language used by the Second Circuit may prevent a shift in the
burden of proof.6 ' Crouse-Hinds placed the initial burden of proving the
directors' interest or bad faith on the plaintiff before a shift in the burden
of proof could occur. In this case, the target company in a counter-claim
was seeking to enjoin the raider company from completing the take-over
on the grounds that the Crouse-Hinds exchange offer was designed solely
to retain control for their management and had no other rational business
purpose.'' However, Crouse-Hinds involved a take-over attempt immedi-
ately following a merger."0 2 The dissent also criticized the majority's reli-
ance on Johnson v. Trueblood,'6" noting that it dealt with how the jury
was to be instructed and not, as in the case at bar, with whether the
evidence should go to the jury at all.' 6' According to the dissent, the
proper interpretation of the business judgment rule in these cases was
that expressed by the dissent in Trueblood. 65 The Trueblood dissent felt
that the showing of control as a motive on the directors' part was suffi-
cient to shift the burden of proof to them to vindicate the transaction.' 6
The dissent then evaluated in detail the evidence presented by Field's
shareholders and rejected the majority's affirmation of the directed ver-
dict. 1 67 In conclusion, the dissent stated that the majority opinion does a
disservice to stockholders and undermines confidence in the system of
corporate governance, because it gives directors free rein to act to the
disadvantage of shareholders and it "announces to stockholders (if they
did not know it before) that they are on their own and may expect little
consideration and less enlightenment from their board of directors when
a tender offeror appears to challenge the directors for control."' 8
acting primarily to retain control, or for their own interests, but rather in the best
interests of the corporation.
Id. at 381.
158. See note 57 supra.
159. 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980).
160. 646 F.2d at 301 n.6.
161. 634 F.2d at 701.
162. Id. at 690.
163. 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980).
164. 646 F.2d at 304.
165. Id.
166. 629 F.2d at 299.
167. 646 F.2d at 305-10.
168. Id. at 312.
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS IN
CORPORATE LAW
The problem with the majority opinion in Marshall Field is the confu-
sion caused by terms and concepts which are unclear in meaning and are
used interchangeably. The business judgment rule defense has two as-
pects. First, the rule protects directors' decisions from judicial scrutiny
when such decisions made in the exercise of business judgment are based
on due care. The duty of due care refers to the consideration given by
directors to all relevant facts and to their awareness of all possibilities.
Decisions authorizing a transaction must be informed decisions. Uphold-
ing this standard of care gives the directors' decision and subsequent ac-
tions a rational basis. Breaching it shows a negligent exercise of business
judgment not protected by the business judgment defense. 6 9
Second, the rule protects directors' decisions from judicial scrutiny
when such decisions made in the exercise of business judgment are based
on good faith, a lack of personal interest or self-dealing, and with the best
interests of the corporation in mind.1 0 This is what the majority denomi-
nates as fiduciary duty. 71 Upholding this duty demonstrates a rational
business purpose or motive. Breaching it indicates bad faith in exercising
business judgment which the business judgment defense declines to
protect.
The majority in Marshall Field does not make a clear delineation be-
tween these two duties of corporate directors. 72 The court reviews the
due care taken by Field's directors as well as the discharge of their fiduci-
ary duty, but the two aspects are blended together throughout the opin-
ion. It is true that the attacking party may prove a breach of either of the
two duties to defeat the business judgment defense and thus shift the
burden of proof to the defendants. 173 However, courts should recognize
the two distinct duties and clearly outline which duty it is addressing in
its review of actions taken in the exercise of business judgment.
One commentator suggests that confusion also results when the courts
use terms whose meanings are unclear in stating what the challenging
party must show to overcome the business judgment rule's defense. 74
Terms such as "gross and palpable overreaching"'175 are too vague to be of
169. See notes 30, 45-48 supra and accompanying text.
170. See notes 31-35, 49-57 supra and accompanying text.
171. 646 F.2d at 293.
172. See generally 646 F.2d at 293-99.
173. See generally notes 43-57 supra and accompanying text.
174. Arsht, Business Judgment, supra note 6, at 101.
175. This term was taken from the dissenting opinion in Case v. New York Cent. R.R., 19
A.D.2d 383, 390, 243 N.Y.S.2d 620, 627 (1st Dept. 1963) (Steuer, J., dissenting), rev'd, 15
N.Y.2d 150, 204 N.E.2d 643, 256 N.Y.S.2d 607 (1965). It was used continuously in subse-
quent Delaware cases. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 722 (Del. 1971); Getty Oil
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aid to either challenging shareholders or reviewing courts. The Marshall
Field court initially uses the terms "self-dealing, fraud, and overreach-
ing"1176 which, as the dissent points out, are "elusive hobgoblins'27 which
are difficult to define. However, later in the opinion, the majority refers to
"improper motives"178 and "bad faith,'17 9 which are perhaps more easily
defined and applied to factual situations. It is commendable that the
Marshall Field court did not resort to obtuse terms such as "gross and
palpable overreaching;" however, confusion still is present in the terms it
used to define what the attacking shareholders had to prove to overcome
the business judgment defense. Perhaps this confusion detracts from a
sound, well-reasoned opinion and adds to the quagmire 80 and contro-
versy surrounding the application of the business judgment rule.
The dissent in Marshall Field reveals an awareness of the possibility of
abuse of the business judgment rule and resulting damage to sharehold-
ers. Its intense scrutiny of the facts suggests an awareness of corporate
realities which underlies the belief that factual decisions concerning mo-
tives and good faith, which are elements of the directors' fiduciary duties,
could be best determined by a jury.'8 ' In the dissent's view, the evidence
in the Marshall Field case was sufficient to overcome the presumption of
good business judgment and should have been placed in the jury's
hands. 8
2
If the jury had been allowed to rule on the issues presented in Marshall
Field, and if they had returned a verdict for Field's shareholders against
the directors, there would have been great repercussions in corporate
boardrooms throughout the country. The courts recognize that boards of
directors should be attentive to all their duties regarding the corporation
and its shareholders. However, the facts in Marshall Field did not justify
a ruling that would serve as a harsh reminder to directors. Nevertheless,
the mere fact that suit was brought in this case has sparked interest in
the corporate world 18  and perhaps thereby has achieved this purpose.
The fatalism of the dissent also seems unjustified in light of recent deci-
sions and trends in corporate law. The courts in general seem to scruti-
Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883, 887 (Del. 1970), rev'g 255 A.2d 717 (Del. Ch. 1969);
Meyerson v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 246 A.2d 789, 794 (Del. Ch. 1967).
176. 646 F.2d at 296.
177. Id. at 299.
178. Id. at 296.
179. Id. at 297.
180. To illustrate the quagmire encountered in applying the business judgment rule, com-
pare Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) with Maldonado v. Flynn, 413
A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980), and Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977) with
Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 402 A.2d 382 (Del. Ch. 1979).
181. 646 F.2d at 304.
182. Id. at 305.
183. See, e.g., The Takeover Crisis: A Special Report, 13 INsTrr. INv. 32 (June 1979);
Bowers, supra note 2.
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nize decisions of directors more carefully when such decisions are made in
situations where large numbers of corporate shares are either issued in
defensive maneuvers or bought with corporate funds, as in parent-subsid-
iary relationships,184 freeze out attempts,18 shareholders' derivative ac-
tions, 8" and take-over attempts.18 7 A recent barrage of articles has ad-
dressed the subject of the duties and liabilities of directors not only in
law reviews but also in business journals. 88 It is interesting to note, how-
ever, that the Supreme Court has refused to review the subject of direc-
tors' duties and liabilities.'89 If directors fail to heed this judicial trend,
they cannot claim not to have been forewarned.
IV. CONCLUSION
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co. is a step in the continuing effort to
define and clarify the good faith standard for corporate directors. It does
not attempt to articulate what challenging shareholders in every case
must show to overcome the initial burden of proof in their attack on cor-
porate directors, nor does it attempt to articulate what corporate direc-
tors in every case must do to protect their decisions from attack. Rather,
it sets forth an example of an insufficient showing by challenging share-
holders. This is a negative approach to delineating the duties of directors,
and its value is perhaps limited to analogous factual situations.
The decision blends the concept of the duty of due care with that of
fiduciary duty. As a result, the application by the court of the business
judgment rule defense and its presumption of sound business judgment
184. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (DeL 1971); Getty Oil Co. v.
Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883 (Del. 1970); Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405
(1962).
185. See, e.g., Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 402 A.2d 382 (Del. Ch. 1979);
Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
186. See, e.g., Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th
Cir. 1980); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1017 (1980); Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Maldonado
v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Zapata v. Maldonado, [1981] SEC. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) 604 G-1; Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980); Auerbach v. Ben-
nett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
187. See, e.g., Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F.2d 192 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 354
(1980); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. In-
terNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980); Golub v. PPD Corp., 576 F.2d 759 (8th Cir.
1978); Gulf & Western Indus., Inc. v. Great A & P Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973);
Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978); GM Sub Corp. v. Lig-
gett Group, Inc., 415 A.2d 473 (Del. 1980).
188. See, e.g., note 183 supra.
189. See, e.g., Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F.2d 192 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 354
(1980); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1017 (1980); Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1129 (1979).
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exercised with care and in good faith is confusing. Marshall Field serves
as a warning to corporate directors, and yet it also points out that each
case involving the relationship of a corporation, its board of directors and
shareholders is unique. Consequently, each unique set of facts presents a
setting against which the application of the business judgment rule and
its aspects of duty of due care and fiduciary duty must be examined
individually.
Lavinia A. James
